An assessment upon the environmental policy in Romania by Florian Marcel Nuţă et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rero20
Download by: [95.168.107.53] Date: 27 December 2016, At: 07:29
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
ISSN: 1331-677X (Print) 1848-9664 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rero20
An assessment upon the environmental policy in
Romania
Florian Marcel Nuţă, Neculai Tabără, Alina Cristina Nuţă & Carmen Creţu
To cite this article: Florian Marcel Nuţă, Neculai Tabără, Alina Cristina Nuţă & Carmen Creţu
(2015) An assessment upon the environmental policy in Romania, Economic Research-
Ekonomska Istraživanja, 28:1, 641-649, DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2015.1083874
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2015.1083874
© 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &
Francis
Published online: 01 Oct 2015.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 416
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
An assessment upon the environmental policy in Romania
Florian Marcel Nuţăa* , Neculai Tabărăb, Alina Cristina Nuţăa and Carmen Creţua
aEconomic Department, Danubius University Galati, B-dul Galaţi nr. 3, 800654 Galaţi, România;
bAlexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Economics, Iasi, Carol 1 Iasi, România
(Received 6 February 2015; accepted 13 August 2015)
The global issues related to greenhouse emissions put pressure on decision-makers to
include the environment in their priorities. Decision-makers around the world seek to
assess their nation’s ecological footprint and discover methods to improve it.
Governments must ﬁnd ways to achieve the national targets and improve environ-
ment quality. It is widely known that one of the major polluting sources today is the
urban agglomeration of tvehicles. This is the main reason for European policies
regarding the renewal of a national automotive ﬂeet and taxation per emissions
volume.
Our study assesses whether there is any signiﬁcant correlation between the Junk
programme’s direct effects (volume of scrapping) and the measure of national vehi-
cles ﬂeet renewal, and if so we wish to deploy a general model describing the
correlation. If the evaluation results show no signiﬁcant correlation we may assume
there are public policy ﬂaws to be investigated in future research. Also we bear in
mind the indirect but afﬁrmed target: environmental health improvement – the reduc-
tion of greenhouse emissions. Given the fact there are only a few studies regarding
the Romanian case, the research may constitute a basis for future developments.
Keywords: environmental policy; ﬁscal policy; public policy; pollution; greenhouse
emissions; scrapping
JEL classiﬁcation: E01; H23; Q58
1. Introduction
As many studies conﬁrm (Fischer & Heutel, 2013; Fischer & Springborn, 2011) there is
an evident correlation between environmental policy and economic development. The
public approach to one or other environmental issue determines changes in macroeco-
nomic indicators and economic growth ﬂuctuations. Some authors, like Angelopoulos,
Economides, and Philippopoulos (2010), even compare the performance of different
environmental policy options. In such performance-based models the emissions are con-
sidered a byproduct of production by decision-makers who engage in pollution abate-
ment activity and try to ﬁnd optimal taxation (Angelopoulos, Economides, &
Philippopoulos, 2013). At the same time it is important for us to understand the implica-
tions of environmental policy thinking that in given conditions of price rigidities, may
generate more macroeconomic volatility (Annicchiarico & Di Dio, 2015). In such condi-
tions and having an economic crisis in the background, it is critical for an emerging
economy to fully understand and be able to model the environmental policy options at
hand.
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We investigate the signiﬁcance of two correlations. One includes cars older than
10 years and the number of vehicles scrapped. The second connects the number of
scrapped vehicles and the carbon dioxide emissions. If the correlation coefﬁcients are
signiﬁcant we deploy the two models trying to set a basis for future researches on the
public environmental policy impact upon the environmental indicators. Our aim is to
identify if the two correlations are valid and signiﬁcant for future research. We
consider that vehicles 10 years or older are highly polluting, being mainly equipped
with non-euro or ancient EU1 or EU2 standard engines. The ‘Junk programme’ is a
government environmental policy tool designed to offer vouchers (the nominal value
of the voucher is €700) for every old environmentally harmful scrapped, the voucher
is to be used towards the purchase of a new vehicle. The main condition for a car to
be eligible for scrapping is that it is a minimum of 10 years of age. Another
important aspect is that the car is still in working order so that it is still contributing
to CO2 emissions by being registered and still in use. For each new car acquired the
customer may use up to three vouchers so the total subsidy for a new car is a
maximum of €2,100.
The number of cars 10 years and older (those discussed as having a signiﬁcant
negative impact on the environment) is inﬂuenced in many ways. One factor is the
national ﬂeet natural ageing, another is the importing of used cars (older than 10 years)
from foreign markets. On the other side are national programmes, driven by public
funds, for phasing out of these cars. We consider the natural outlet of the movement of
such vehicles. This component is considered a negligible volume compared with other
elements.
Being funded from the public environment budget the scrapping programme aims
primarily to cleanse the national ﬂeet of heavily polluting vehicles and thus ultimately
reducing greenhouse emissions in the territory of Romania.
At a time of ﬁscal measures, doubling the ﬁrst registration tax for old cars enter-
ing the country could have the desired effect. The policy mix (incentives for ‘junk’
removal and subsidies for new car acquisition; inhibiting the import of used cars) had
its ﬂaws. Due to inconsistent tax measures (regarding the importing of old cars from
outside the country), challenged and amended on many occasions, the import of old
cars continued and may cancel the positive effects of ‘junk’ removal from the national
automotive ﬂeet.
Our objective is to demonstrate whether the scrappage programme has any impact at
all upon environment quality and to launch the premise for future research, including
the ﬁscal incentives as variables in determining the proper policy.
The novelty of our article consists in the fact that the government Junk Programme
was not yet the object of any assessment. We also consider that discovering if the
correlations we propose are valid or not may be the basis for future research, using our
ﬁndings as starting point.
2. The public environmental policy in review
Generally the sets of policies and instruments available for decision-makers are persua-
sive, cooperative, economic (or market-based), procedural and regulatory (Böcher &
Töller, 2003, 2007; Böcher, 2012; Howlett & Ramesh, 1995; Schmitt & Schulze, 2011;
Pesqueux, 2009). Also the public policy can maximise its non-proﬁt focus and set very
generous objectives regardless of costs if the public demand asks it (Ramos, Alves,
Subtil, & Melo, 2007). Moreover an environmental public policy is not made for
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addressing economic development objectives or for the individual interest of some
private enterprises.
It is obvious in the last decade that the classical approach of public controlling of
the environmental issues is not fully addressing the environmental degradation speed
and the complex implications upon human life and economic growth. New public policy
tools such as environmental taxes, subsidies and other market-based measures came
forward to fulﬁl government empowerment (Sterner, 2012).
The sensitivity of the environmental problems is ampliﬁed in some cases by the cor-
ruption and tax morality levels. According to recent ﬁndings (Harring, 2014), especially
for emerging countries such as Romania, corruption issues can make it very hard to
assess the environmental policy measures or even identify whether they are properly
used (Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, & Schleifer, 2010).
The simplest approach of the pollution matter is the Pigou principle which states
that the polluter must pay for his negative environmental impact (Pigou, 1920). In time
the economic activity diversiﬁcation and the complexity of environmental issues called
for new approaches and new interpretations for the public decision-makers. Moreover
the simple payment for pollution did not solve the increasing and constant depletion of
environmental resources. In time, pollution became something you have to pay for with
some of your proﬁts, like any other service or merchandise. It was simply another cost
you had to account for in your production.
Time has proved that the one-dimensional approach toward environmental matters
is insufﬁcient and combinations of instruments and policies are more suitable for such
complex issue as the protection of the environment (Böcher, 2012). For example the
environmental taxation moved forward from only ‘punishing’ the bad to use the rev-
enues for reducing the taxation of the ‘good’ (income tax or social security contribu-
tions) (Ekins, Summerton, Thoung, & Lee, 2011; Ekins & Barker, 2001; Ciegis,
2008). The double dividend hypothesis in the environmental taxation matter is not
seen as a general theory, and some studies proved that in some cases the revenues
from environmental taxation had beneﬁcial side effects upon other ﬁelds (for example
employment) (Capros, 1996; Fullerton & Metcalf, 1997; Grubb, Edmonds, ten Brink,
& Morrison, 1993; Kumbaroglu, 2003), even in the short-term only (Bontems &
Bourgeon, 2005; Carraro, Galeotti, & Gallo, 1996). The environmental taxation could
be effective for economic growth (Bovenberg & de Mooij, 1997; Ekins et al., 2011)
by even stimulating research and development activities (Nakada, 2004). But there
were situations when nothing happened or even worse, there was unemployment and
bad economic side effects (Fullerton & Metcalf, 1997). The crowding out effect in
terms of private expenditures (Haung & Cai, 1994; Itaya, 2008; Ligthart & van der
Ploeg, 1994) is seen as the main argument for not using a simple environmental
policy based on hyper ﬁscal measures.
Although we accept that the environmental policies (including taxation as a
major regulating tool) may spread its beneﬁcial effects upon not only environmental
welfare, the main beneﬁt is keeping the environment damages and pollution at low-
est levels as possible. We consider the environmental welfare as being the sum of
all natural resources (water, wildlife, etc.) and environmental conditions (mainly
related to public health such as the air) unaffected by the human activity. The CO2
emissions are one of the most prevalent air contaminants and are associated with
urban agglomerations and combustion engines (Wu, Zhang, Xu, & Zhu, 2011). The
Kyoto protocol established limits and the automotive industry developed new stan-
dards trying to diminish the pollution. Today cars are less harmful than the old ones
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(those aged 10 years or older). The national governments try to renew their
automotive ﬂeet and grant subsidies and different kind of incentives for new acquisi-
tion (less the pollutant the bigger the incentive) and encourage the cars owners to
give up their old vehicles.
The approach tends to redirect the old automobiles (non-Euro, Euro 1, 2, 3, mostly
older than 10 years) to emerging countries such as Romania, where purchasing power
inﬂuences the consumer to buy second-hand cars. Given these facts we try to establish
if the JUNK Programme achieved its targets and lessened greenhouse emissions
(ANMP, 2012).
The government programme’s beneﬁcial effect upon the environment quality was
contested by a vast number of specialised NGOs. The same NGOs also afﬁrm that the
poor substantiation of the programme’s objectives and future developments was one of
the causes. Moreover the shortage of research studies and non-governmental reports and
analysis determines the poor understanding and explanation of the public policy choices
in this matter. This shortage is why we developed a study based on scarce fragmented
public data and almost no other research approaches the programme effects.
3. The modelling
The explanation for choosing cars older than 10 years for our assessment is that most of
them are in the non-Euro, Euro 1, 2 and 3 family. It is known that the last models pro-
vided by the automotive industry (Euro 4 and 5) are less harmful to the environment
than the older ones. The government programme, entitled ‘JUNK’, explicitly set as the
main target the scrapping of cars produced more than 10 years ago.
We chose the CO2 emissions to describe the environmental damage in our study. It
is directly connected to the automotive way of transportation and was named as the
main reason for global warming (European Environment Agency [EEA], 2008; Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2007; United Nations [UN], 1998). It
also represents more than 75% of the anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2007).
We test the correlation coefﬁcient by trying to explain the correlation between the
chosen public environmental policies: the ﬁrst determines the efﬁciency of the JUNK
Programme by the correlation between the number of ‘junks’ and the scrapping
volume; the second puts into context the scrapping volume and the carbon dioxide
emissions.
3.1. The correlation coefﬁcient assessment – testing the relation between ‘junks’ and
scrapping volume
The premise is that the number of national automotive ‘junks’ is inﬂuenced by the
scrapping volume. Given the natural ageing speed of the national ﬂeet and no external
entrance of ‘junks’ the scrapping should directly inﬂuence the ﬂeet renewal. We also
know that the ﬁscal measures (the ﬁrst registration tax) inhibit the import of ‘junks’ and
should maintain a neutral impact of external imports.
In the ﬁrst stage of our assessment we describe the correlation model between the
scrapping volume as an independent variable and the total number of vehicles older than
10 years in the national automotive ﬂeet.
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The correlation coefﬁcient (R) shows a connection between the two variables
(Table 1).
Given the value of Sig the assumption that the number of national automotive
‘junks’ is inﬂuenced by the scrapping volume is correct. The volume of scrapping
should directly inﬂuence the structure of the national automotive ﬂeet in terms of how
old it is.
The evolution of ‘junk’ scrapping as a result of the governmental programme does
not explains the trend of cars older than 10 years in Romania, given the inﬂuence of
other decisive factors as the incoherence of the ﬁscal instruments and in this context the
growing imports of old cars. These two factors’ (the ﬁscal incoherence and the
second-hand automobile import) effects are stronger than the beneﬁcial effects of the
scrapping programme. This is obvious from when we are assessing the evolution for the
2007–2012 (the ﬁrst registration tax – a tax meant to inhibit second-hand imports – was
ﬁrst implemented in 2007 and suffered different modiﬁcations due to the risk of an ‘in-
fringement’ procedure from the EC). From 2007 the number of registered vehicles older
than 10 years grew constantly from 1.6 million to approximately 2.4 million in 2012.
Moreover if in 2009 the cars 10 years or older made up 33% of the total, in 2012 they
reached approximately 55%. This was accompanied by the increase of the average age
of the national automotive stock from 10 to 12 years. At the same time the EU average
age was eight years.
As the correlation coefﬁcient is statistically relevant (Sig<0.05) we can deploy the
model as follows (Table 2):
Y ¼ 2; 642X þ 1; 389; 088; 752 (1)
3.2. The correlation coefﬁcient assessment – testing the relation between the volume
of scrapping and the carbon dioxide emissions
From our point of view it is obvious that the ﬁnal objective of public environmental
policy is to eliminate highly polluting vehicles. Moreover the premises for implementing
Table 1. Testing the correlation between numbers of cars over 10-years-old and scrapping
volume.
No.crt R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 .437a .191 .029 3.78799E5
Note: aPredictors: (Constant), Scrapp_vol; b. Dependent Variable: cars_over_10y.
Source: Own calculations.





B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 1389088752 192446367 7,218 .001
Scrapp_vol 2,642 2,431 .437 1,087 .0032
Note: Dependent Variable: cars_over_10y.
Source: Own calculations.
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such a policy is because studies show that ‘junks’ are a bad inﬂuence upon air quality
and the volume of green emissions. Logically we cannot discuss of a public policy
developed without any impact study or target setting. As a result of this assumption the
environmental public policy is a success if the environmental improvement targets are
achieved. If not, we are talking about failure.
The second model describes the correlation between the volume of scrapping
(independent variable) and the carbon dioxide emissions (independent variable) (Table 3).
Again even the two variables would seem very connected we ﬁnd that because of the lim-
its of the public policy (failure of taxation for affecting activities – imports of old cars),
the model shows the connection is insigniﬁcant. In other words even the volume of scrap-
ping has a positive trend the carbon dioxide emissions keep constant. The fact could be
the cause of the imports of ‘junks’ that keep the pace with the scrapping of ‘junks’. In the
2008–2012 period the vehicle imports of 10 years and older were constant, even growing
in 2012 (by about 75,000 vehicles ) and 2013 due to the new ﬁrst registration tax (smaller
tax for older cars). In the same period the report between new car registration and second-
hand registration changed from 2.5 new cars registered for each second-hand one to 0.4
new cars for each second-hand car. So the positive effect in eliminating old heavily pollut-
ing automotives is levelled by the volume of ‘junk’ imports in the same period and the
inability of the ﬁrst registration tax to inhibit ‘junk’ imports.
The model cannot be deployed as the correlation coefﬁcient shows no signiﬁcant
relation between the two variables (Sig>0.05) (Table 4).
Conclusion
The government has a good initiative when offering subsidies for new car acquisition
but they fail to empower this active measure by taxing the ‘bad’ behaviour (importing
old and highly polluting cars).
If the public policy implemented for environmental protection was set to achieve
environmental targets the only conclusion if the targets are not achieved is that is has
failed.
Table 3. Testing the correlation between CO2 emissions and scrapping volume.
No crt. R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 .221a .049 -.142 992,06870
Note: aPredictors: (Constant), Scrapp_vol; b. Dependent Variable: co2_emission.
Source: Own calculations.








Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 12942,904 504,014 25,680 .000
Scrapp_vol .003 .006 .221 .506 .634
Note: Dependent Variable: co2_emission.
Source: Own calculations.
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This failure to connect the two measures – encouraging the renewal of the national
transportation ﬂeet with penalising the bad behaviour of importing ‘junks’ – levels the
beneﬁts of the JUNK Programme. First the decision-makers described the programme as
an economic incentive for the domestic car industry. We also show that when decision-
makers fail to explain and popularise a good decision public policy turns against the
government and instead of beneﬁts can bring losses for all the actors.
We also can propose another assessment for future research including the ﬁscal
beneﬁts of the environmental measures and the actual environmental beneﬁts. We wish
to verify, for the case of Romania, if the beneﬁcial effects are spreading or only
manifest upon the environmental ﬁgures.
Furthermore our study may be the basis for further assessments upon the state of
environmental policy tools option in Romania and other similar countries. We seek to
evaluate whether the environmental policy can be modernised in Romania based on its
current performance.
As a policy recommendation we suggest that taxation and subsidies’ predictability is
critical in terms of environmental policy. The unstable climate regarding the environmen-
tal policy and public policy as a whole cannot bring sustainable positive effects, but only
random changes in terms of environmental performance at national level. The random
effects may be a result of economic crises, demographic changes or socio-economic
developments. A better planning of environmental tasks and targets by which to achieve
them is desirable for creating environmentally-friendly behaviour among agents.
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